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WAR DEPARTMENT

BASIC FIELD MANUAL



Volume X

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Part One

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

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BASIC FIELD MANUAL



Volume X MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Part One COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Prepared under direction of the
Chief of Staff



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1938

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY
AUTHORITY OF DOD DIR. 5200.1 R
BY ADKWS ON 5/12/03

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, *July 15, 1938.*

Part One, Combat Intelligence, Basic Field Manual, Volume X, Military Intelligence, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

[A. G. 062.11 (5-20-38).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

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*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

(II)

FOREWORD

A general must be governed by his intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It is his duty to obtain correct information; and among the most valuable traits of a military character is the skill to select those means which will obtain it. Yet the best selected means are not always successful; and, in a new army where military talent has not been well tried by the standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the chance of employing not the best instruments.

From John Marshall's Life of George Washington.

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PART ONE

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

(The matter contained herein supersedes TR 210-5, September 20, 1926, including C 1, January 2, 1929.)

SECTION I

GENERAL

1. **Scope.**—*a.* This manual sets forth the fundamental considerations relative to combat intelligence and is prescribed as a guide in the organization, training, and employment of the intelligence personnel of all combat units.

b. This manual is based on fundamental doctrines contained in Field Service Regulations. Special methods and details peculiar to the various arms which are not covered herein are prescribed in their respective Field Manuals.

2. **Definitions.**—*a. Information.*—All documents, facts, or observations of any kind which may serve to throw light on the enemy or the theater of operations constitute information. No information should be neglected. Information which seems unimportant at first glance may, on being compared with that already received, assume primary importance. The value of information is increased when the circumstances concerning its origin, including the time at which it was obtained, are known.

b. Military intelligence.—Military intelligence is collated and evaluated information concerning a possible or actual enemy, or theater of operations, together with the conclusions drawn therefrom. It includes information concerning the enemy capabilities or the possible lines of action open to him, as well as all that relates to the territory controlled by or subject to his influence.

3. **Classes of intelligence.**—Military intelligence is divided into two general classes, combat intelligence and War Department intelligence.

a. Combat intelligence.—Combat intelligence is the military intelligence produced in the field, after the outbreak of hostilities, by the Military Intelligence Section of GHQ and the

military intelligence sections of all subordinate units. Usually this class of intelligence is confined to the terrain and to the location, strength, composition, dispositions, movements, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, training, discipline, and morale of the enemy forces opposing a combat unit and the deductions made from a consideration of these factors. In the army and higher organizations it includes the broader aspects of military intelligence of particular importance in strategical decisions.

b. War Department intelligence.—(1) War Department intelligence is the military intelligence produced under the direction of the War Department General Staff in peace and in war. Every country and possible theater of operations is studied. These studies include composition, distribution, fighting quality, organization, armament, equipment, and tactical and supply methods of the armed forces; the personality of high commanders; the resources in manpower and material, and the period of time required to convert these to military use; the economic and political conditions and aspirations; the history and national psychology; and the military geography, topography, and climatic conditions. This intelligence furnishes the basis for projected operations and for the changes in organization, training, armament, equipment, and supplies to meet the tactical methods of a particular enemy, possible or actual.

(2) The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff is responsible for keeping this intelligence up to date and for issuing the necessary maps, monographs, and reports to the field forces whenever required by them.

4. Military intelligence in the commander's decision.—*a.* The commander's decision is based upon the mission as affected by the following:

- (1) The enemy to be dealt with in accomplishing the mission.
- (2) The terrain over which the operation must be conducted.
- (3) The means available for the execution of the mission.

b. Before making a decision initiating action designed to accomplish his mission, the commander will need information concerning the two unknown factors, the enemy and the terrain; and, having made a decision, he will require information which will permit him to continue projected operations and accomplish his mission regardless of what the enemy may do, or to make a new decision in view of the changed situation. Military intelligence thus plays a direct part in every decision, the soundness of which will depend in each case upon the accuracy of information regarding the two unknown factors and upon the

ability of the commander to understand correctly the influence of the various factors upon the problem. Consequently, for each decision of the commander there should be, whenever appropriate, an intelligence plan designed to coordinate the search for the definite information which the particular situation demands.

5. Object of combat intelligence.—It is the object of combat intelligence work to reduce, as far as possible, the uncertainties regarding the enemy and the local conditions and thus assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their assigned missions.

6. Difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information.—The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information and in arriving at reliable conclusions based thereon are many. These difficulties are due principally to the fact that the interests of the enemy demand that he shall make every possible effort to foil our attempts to gain information. He will resort to deception; he will conceal his movements by night marches and by counterreconnaissance measures involving the use of both ground and aerial agencies; he will make use of camouflage; he will resort to any measures that offer a reasonable hope of obtaining secrecy or surprise; and he will sometimes adopt a course of action that may appear illogical. The opposition of the enemy's interest to our own, as well as the independence of his will, must necessarily make him more or less an unknown factor in every situation. To a less degree the terrain also is an unknown factor.

SECTION II

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

7. Unit commander.—Since intelligence constitutes a vital element in the commander's estimate of the situation leading to any tactical or strategical decision, it is a basic function of command to initiate and coordinate the search for the necessary information upon which to base decisions. In addition, a commander may receive reconnaissance missions from higher authority. These may or may not coincide with his own requirements for information. In any case, each commander is charged with the collection of military information within his zone of operations for the use of his own and higher headquarters. The width and depth of the zone in which a commander is responsible for information may be designated either by higher authority or by the commander himself when acting alone. The most important consideration in either case is to cover a zone of

sufficient width and depth to prevent tactical surprise. In determining this zone the commander gives due consideration to the mobility of any forces the enemy may possibly possess, particularly any mechanized and motorized units, as this affects directly the distance to which it is necessary to conduct the search for information.

8. Intelligence officer or assistant chief of staff, G-2. (Wherever the term intelligence officer or G-2 is used in this manual it is interpreted to include the S-2 of all lower combat units.)—*a.* At the headquarters of every combat unit the intelligence officer will concern himself primarily with the functions of military intelligence. It is his duty to keep the commander and all interested staff officers informed regarding the enemy situation and to give them the results of his deductions as to the lines of action open to the enemy and, when possible, the relative probability of their adoption by the enemy.

b. Under the supervision and direction of the chief of staff or unit commander, it will be the duty of the intelligence officer to—

- (1) Specify the information to be gathered.
- (2) Initiate a systematic and coordinated search for required information by all available collecting agencies.
- (3) Collate, evaluate, and interpret the information derived from all possible sources.
- (4) Reduce intelligence to a systematic form and distribute it to all concerned in time to be of value to the recipients.
- (5) Insure that intelligence is given due consideration in the preparation of plans, and that orders, formal or fragmentary, are checked to see that this has been done.
- (6) Prevent the enemy from obtaining information about our own troops.
- (7) Assure an adequate supply and distribution of maps and map substitutes.
- (8) Maintain close liaison with the G-2 section of higher, lower, and adjacent units.
- (9) Exercise general supervision over all intelligence activities in the unit.

9. Dual functions.—The military intelligence section is one of the coordinate sections of every general staff and of similarly organized staffs. It has operative functions as well as general staff functions which vary in scope with the size of the command. In the lower units the operative functions may be confined to observation and the examination of prisoners and docu-

ments, while at GHQ they include publicity, counterpropaganda, censorship, control of visitors, counterespionage, espionage, and others.

10. Principles of organization.—*a.* The intelligence section should be able to handle information of a scope commensurate with the size and the mission of the command. It should be so organized and equipped that it will fit into the living and working conditions of the command in all situations while retaining the degree of mobility essential to the arm; and its organization should facilitate the collection, collation, evaluation, and interpretation of information as well as the prompt dissemination of the resulting intelligence to all concerned.

b. In the division and lower combat units the primary functions of the intelligence section are the collection, collation, evaluation, and interpretation of information, and the dissemination of combat intelligence. The organization should be simple; the methods employed should insure speed; and the facilities available at the headquarters should be appropriate to the unit and the arm concerned. Complete details of operation are contained in the Field Manuals of the respective arms.

SECTION III

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

11. Coordination.—*a. General.*—The ability of the enemy to act in various ways within his assigned mission and the limited and diverse nature of information-gathering agencies available to the commander require an understanding of the enemy capabilities and the most careful coordination of all intelligence activities.

b. Enemy capabilities.—(1) In any situation the lines of action open to the enemy which can possibly affect our mission are called the enemy capabilities for that particular situation. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general lines of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular lines of action possible under each general line of action. For example, under the general line of action of an attack the various particular lines of action possible are an attack today, an attack tomorrow, a wide or close-in envelopment of our left flank, a piecemeal attack against our front, and others.

(2) Before designating the essential elements of information for the coordination of all intelligence activities, the commander

and his intelligence officer should have estimated the enemy capabilities based on the situation known at the time. In making this estimate every possible maneuver of the enemy capable of having an effect on the plan of the commander should be considered. All maneuvers having the same or a similar effect on the commander's plan should be grouped. This will reduce the number of lines of action to be considered and simplify the work of comparing each of them with our own plan. However, the commander and G-2 should not limit their activities to these capabilities alone but should constantly consider all possible lines of enemy action in their relation to the commander's plan.

c. Essential elements of information.—(1) The essential elements of information constitute that information of the enemy or terrain which a commander greatly desires in order to make a decision, conduct a maneuver, or enable his staff to formulate the details of a plan. These essential elements are designated for the purpose of focusing the attention and activities of all collecting agencies on that information which, from the viewpoint of the commander, is necessary at a particular time. Until rescinded they constitute the general directive for all information-collecting agencies. They may be expressed either in the form of questions or of items of information desired.

(2) It is the duty of the commander to obtain correct information bearing upon his mission and to insure the coordination of all collecting agencies at his disposal. He is therefore responsible for the designation of the essential elements of information. He makes the basic decisions and exercises the continuing supervision which insure that the intelligence effort is directed along the proper lines. In determining the essential elements, however, he is assisted by his chief of staff and G-2. G-2 should study continuously, in collaboration with the other members of the staff, particularly G-3, our own and the enemy situation, the possible lines of action open to the enemy, and the influence of the terrain and other local conditions on these lines of action. Based on this study, G-2 should at all times be prepared to recommend to the commander the essential elements of information and to give the important considerations governing their selection.

NOTE.—Wherever the term G-3 is used in this manual it is interpreted to include the S-3 of all lower combat units.

12. Information not limited to that bearing on essential elements.—The essential elements of information are guides

governing the search for information and not limitations regulating the information to be obtained and reported. Therefore, collecting agencies will not confine their activities exclusively to collecting information bearing on the essential elements. It is their duty to collect and transmit all classes of enemy information. This, however, must not interfere with the principal mission—that of obtaining information in regard to the essential elements.

13. Nature of information required.—In order to determine the type of information required to answer the essential elements of information, G-2 must understand the object and scope of the study and the sources and significance of information. The following are some of the considerations he should take into account:

a. Study of terrain.—(1) *Responsibility.*—In the study of the terrain, G-2 cooperates with G-3. He will be prepared to give an estimate of the terrain from the enemy point of view, including the favorable and unfavorable effects of the terrain on all possible lines of action open to the enemy.

(2) *Sources of information.*—The sources of information for a study of the terrain are maps; vertical and oblique aerial photographs; personal reconnaissance, when possible; the troops, particularly the Cavalry and Air Corps; inhabitants and special agents; and geographical reports from higher headquarters.

(3) *Scope.*—If time and facilities permit, the study of the terrain should include—

(a) *A map study of its relief.*—The stream lines and ridge lines should be plainly marked in two colors. Lines that are noticeably heavier should be used to indicate ridges or summits commanding distant views and cuts or breaks in the terrain forming obstacles. The salient features of the terrain should be made to stand out clearly as in an impressionistic sketch.

(b) *A map study of the topographical features other than relief.*—The communications, including railways, navigable waterways and roads, localities, woods, and open areas, are noted and shown in colors, if possible.

(c) *Available resources.*—The area under consideration should be studied to determine the supplies that could be drawn therefrom and the importance of the area to the economic life of the country. Studies of this class are made only by the larger units.

(d) *Meteorological conditions.*—Although the meteorological conditions do not constitute a part of a terrain study, nevertheless

less they have such an immediate and important relation to terrain that they should be included in the study.

b. Study of the enemy.—(1) *Importance.*—The enemy represents the most uncertain factor. No matter how painstakingly information may be sought, it is difficult to obtain and when obtained is frequently too old to be of use. Even if the enemy's position and means are known, it is difficult to evaluate his morale and almost impossible to know his intentions. The continuous increase in mobility of fire and speed of movement reduces the time during which any given information is of value. The improvement in means of collecting information has not compensated for this shortening of time. The intelligence officer must therefore exercise a continuous supervision and coordination over the search for additional information.

(2) *Object.*—The main object of the continuing study of the enemy is to determine his capabilities and, if possible, the line of action he has adopted. After this has been done the objective then becomes the determination of any change in his capabilities or line of action. At all times G-2 must consider every capability open to the enemy and so direct the efforts of the collecting agencies that there will not be a surprise, regardless of the action taken by the enemy.

(3) *Information desired.*—The information desired varies with the size of the unit and with the development of the situation during the operations. Depending upon the situation, the following factors are of varying importance:

(a) *Distance between opposing forces.*—The distance between the opposing forces and the local conditions will show with what elements the enemy can engage and will indicate, in a general way, the line of contact under various estimates as to his future actions.

(b) *Enemy movements.*—The enemy's dispositions on the ground and his movements, including direction, time, and location of heads of columns, will furnish indications of his plan of maneuver and of his capabilities.

(c) *Enemy dispositions.*—Information of the location and strength of the hostile position and the dispositions thereon will facilitate the quickest possible action and the gathering of additional information. This should include information of the frontages held by the hostile units and the limits of their zones of action; the location of strong and weak points; the deployment of artillery, with strength and type of matériel, location of the mass, amount of reinforcing artillery,

depth of echelonment, density, and lateral displacement; the location, amount, and activity of antiaircraft artillery; the location of large tank concentrations; hostile aviation activity over the area; enemy radio activity; the enemy reserves with position, strength, and composition and the time required to enter action; the distant reinforcements capable of intervening, with strength and composition; and the enemy logistical arrangements with location of installations, important supply centers, and sensitive points on the lines of communication. The locations of the mass of the artillery and of the mass of the reserves furnish very important indications of the operations planned by the enemy. If the enemy is capable of using mechanized units and aviation in force, these indications may be less valuable.

(d) *Means available to the enemy.*

1. *Troops.*—The designation of units, strength, composition, physical condition, training, and morale of the troops, and ability of the hostile commander.

2. *Matériel and supply.*—The type, condition, capacity, and quantity of matériel available to the enemy and the adequacy or inadequacy of his supply, especially of munitions.

(e) *Enemy defensive measures.*—Defensive measures of the enemy furnish important evidence of his proposed plan of action. He may supplement natural obstacles with prepared obstacles intended to deny or obstruct our maneuver or to facilitate his own. The following factors furnish important indications of the enemy plan:

1. *Organization of the ground.*—Successive lines of defense, supporting positions and communication, depth of the defensive position, and echelonment of positions.

2. *Strength of organization.*—Organized field works, their type and degree of completion; wire entanglements, shelters, gun emplacements, observation posts, command posts, and communication; and antitank and antiaircraft defensive measures.

3. *Demolitions.*—Location, extent, and nature of all demolitions on roads, bridges, and railways.

4. *Inundations.*—Location of flooded areas or of areas that may be flooded.

5. *Gas.*—Location and extent of areas contaminated with gas, including the nature of the contaminating agent.

14. **Collecting agencies.**—*a.* The collecting agencies available to a combat unit vary with its size, facilities, and distance from the front. The battalion is the smallest unit provided with intelligence personnel. It collects its information mainly by means of patrols, scouts, observation posts, reports of front-line companies, and the hasty examination of prisoners of war, enemy deserters, inhabitants, and documents. At the other extreme is the army or GHQ, which has at its disposal such facilities as aviation for visual and photographic reconnaissance, radio intercept, radio goniometry, secret agents, and sound and flash ranging. The organic collecting agencies of each combat unit are prescribed by the appropriate Tables of Organization. Additional collecting agencies may be attached to units which are operating alone.

b. Chemical intelligence is derived from troops in the same way as any other combat intelligence. Specially trained personnel forward information of this nature to the unit intelligence officer, who incorporates it in his reports to higher headquarters.

c. Information-collecting agencies available in a combat unit may include part or all of the following:

(1) *Military intelligence personnel.*—This personnel, directly under the orders of the intelligence officer, is assigned to units for the sole duty of conducting intelligence activities, which may include—

(*a*) *Installation and operation of an observation service.*—In addition to ground observation maintained by troop units themselves, intelligence personnel may establish and maintain supplemental observation of the enemy within the zone of action of the unit.

(*b*) *Action of intelligence scouts.*—The sole mission of intelligence scouts, either when operating alone or in conjunction with reconnaissance patrols or raiding parties, is to gather information. They engage in combat only in furtherance of this mission.

(*c*) *Examination of prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, and inhabitants.*—Proper examination of prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, and inhabitants furnishes valuable and accurate information concerning the enemy order of battle, organization, dispositions, plans and preparations, morale, and numerous other subjects. Specially trained interpreters of the intelligence service conduct the examination.

(*d*) *Examination of captured documents.*—This study furnishes valuable information relative to the enemy order of battle, troop movements, economic conditions, tactical doctrine, morale, and other subjects. The systematic examination of captured documents of both a personal and official nature is a function of specially trained intelligence personnel. At times they may be assisted by Signal Corps specialists in cryptography.

(*e*) *Liaison.*—Close liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent units by means of special agents, particularly during battle, facilitates the rapid transmittal of information vital to the commander concerned.

(*f*) *Examination of captured matériel.*—The examination of captured matériel by qualified experts enables our forces to keep an accurate check on new developments and eventually leads to the adoption of new technique, tactical doctrine, or matériel to meet these developments.

(*g*) *Study of the hostile and neutral press.*—This study furnishes important information bearing on enemy resources, political conditions, and morale as well as information concerning recruiting, troop movements, and other subjects, even though censorship may be applied.

(*h*) *Espionage.*—Secret agents sometimes procure accurate information of vital importance in the conduct of operations. However, information from this source will require the most careful analysis and evaluation to determine its reliability.

(2) *Troops.*—(*a*) It is the continuing duty of every combat unit to secure all possible information of the enemy and to report such information to higher and affected adjacent commands with the least possible delay. In the absence of positive information, negative information should be reported. In addition to this continuing duty, intelligence missions may be assigned to troop units, directing them to gain certain definite information required by the commander.

(*b*) In addition to the collection of documents found on the enemy dead and on prisoners, arrangements should be made for the collection of all printed matter or manuscripts found in places lately occupied by the enemy. Immediately following the occupation of a town or village, steps should be taken to seize vacated enemy headquarters, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchanges, police stations, and government and municipal offices in order to prevent the destruction of valuable documents and records.

(c) Troop units maintain continuous observation over the areas immediately to the front by means of ground observation and by aerial observation when aviation is available. Visual observation should be supplemented by aerial photographs when possible.

(3) *Special information services of component units of the command.*—These services are, in general, technical and operated primarily in the interest of the auxiliary arms which they serve. They are not under the direct supervision of the intelligence section. However, the closest cooperation and liaison are maintained between these agencies and the intelligence section, which should be furnished with all information procured. These services include—

(a) *Artillery intelligence sections.*—In addition to the normal facilities, sound and flash ranging sections may be included.

(b) *Air Corps intelligence service.*

(c) *Antiaircraft intelligence service.*

(d) *Signal intelligence service.*—In the army and higher headquarters the signal intelligence service includes telegraph and telephone listening stations, radio interception and radio goniometry, and laboratories for the solution of codes and ciphers and secret inks.

(e) *Engineer listening service.*

(f) *Aircraft warning service.*

(4) *Higher and adjacent units.*—Close liaison with higher and adjacent units should facilitate the acquisition of valuable information.

d. The adaptation of new scientific developments to war is gradually making the task of G-2 more complex; at the same time, however, it affords him additional means for the collection of information. Every new invention that may possibly be used as an information-gathering or transmitting device should be tested immediately for this purpose.

15. *Intelligence plan.*—a. The essential elements of information having been announced, it is necessary that definite and precise instructions for obtaining the required information be given to the collecting agencies. To avoid any possibility of omission or conflict the intelligence officer must follow a logical, orderly mental process in analyzing and transforming the essential elements of information into missions, in allotting the missions to collecting agencies, and in designating the time when and the place where information is to be reported. The scope of the intelligence plan depends upon the sphere of action of the

commander for whom it is drawn. It will be subsequently modified to conform to new decisions made by the commander during the development of the situation. A form for use in the preparation of the intelligence plan is as follows:

INTELLIGENCE (G-2) PLAN

Phases or periods of the operation	Essential elements of information	Analysis of essential elements of information	Collecting agency or other source	Specific orders or requests	Hour and destination at which information is to be reported
					Remarks

b. *Formulation of intelligence plan.*—The intelligence officer completes the plan by filling out the columns from left to right.

(1) *Phases or periods of the operation.*—This column refers to either the phases of the operation to be undertaken or the time interval to be covered.

(2) *Essential elements of information.*—In this column are recorded, in brief form, the essential elements of information to govern in the projected operations or situation.

(3) *Analysis of essential elements of information.*—In this column the intelligence officer briefly records the results of his analysis of the essential elements of information, setting down items of information that would be needed to answer the questions asked or implied by the wording of the essential elements. Certain essential elements will require very little analysis by the intelligence officer in order to transform them into suitable reconnaissance missions. If the information to be obtained gives a direct answer to the inquiry contained in an essential element, analysis is unnecessary. Others, however, must be subjected to careful analysis in order to determine what indications must be sought to answer the inquiries contained therein. The object of this analysis is to break down the essential elements into indications of possible enemy action that will furnish the basis for definite reconnaissance missions.

(4) *Collecting agency or other source.*—In this column the intelligence officer records the agency or agencies to be assigned the mission of collecting information bearing on the indications of enemy action. If the information is to be requested of higher or adjacent units, these sources are also listed. To utilize

properly the available collecting agencies in the search for information it is essential that the intelligence officer is thoroughly conversant with their powers and limitations and co-operates closely with G-3.

(5) *Specific orders or requests.*—Having analyzed the essential elements and having recorded the general manifestations or indications corresponding to each plan open to the enemy, the intelligence officer next sets down the specific orders for the collecting agencies and the requests to be made on higher or adjacent units. Each of these agencies is given specific and definite missions in accordance with its characteristics and limitations. It is frequently the case that several agencies may be utilized in establishing one definite fact bearing on an essential element.

(6) *Hour and destination at which information is to be reported.*—From a knowledge of the plan of operations gained by close cooperation with G-3, the intelligence officer determines when and where essential information must be reported in order to be of use to the commander. In determining the time at which information must be available, the intelligence officer is guided by the fact that information arriving too late is of no value and information arriving in advance of its actual need is likely to be inaccurate at the time when projected operations are undertaken.

16. Instructions to collecting agencies.—*a. General.*—When approved, the completed intelligence plan forms the basis for orders to all collecting agencies. These orders are either published to the collecting agencies as an intelligence annex to field orders or by fragmentary orders. When combat units are required to execute tactical operations in order to obtain information, their tactical missions only and not details of the information required will be covered by paragraph 3 of the field order.

b. Intelligence annex.—(1) The intelligence annex is issued by a reinforced brigade or higher unit when reconnaissance missions would unduly lengthen the field order. The instructions to each collecting agency are placed together in one paragraph of the intelligence annex. If time is of vital importance, reconnaissance missions should not be unduly delayed pending the publication of an annex; accordingly, instructions to the various collecting agencies in such cases should be issued in fragmentary form.

(2) A form for the intelligence annex is prescribed in part one, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

SECTION IV

COLLATION OF INFORMATION

17. Preliminary examination of information.—*a.* Upon receipt at the G-2 office, all information should be immediately examined to determine whether it has intelligence value. This will prevent the cluttering of the communication system, intelligence journal, work sheet, and situation map with useless information.

b. Before an item of information is disposed of it is subjected to the following analysis:

(1) Is it information of the enemy or of the terrain not under our control?

(2) Is it new information needed immediately and, if so, by whom?

(3) Is it information of future value?

(4) Is it information of value to this unit or to higher, subordinate, or adjacent units?

(5) In which documents and under which heads should the information be recorded to receive proper consideration?

c. Information should be considered in connection with other information of the same classification which has already been collected. This requires some system of sorting out and segregating all information of the same classification so that items of the same character may be kept together for convenience of comparison and study.

18. Method of recording.—*a.* In matters relative to the recording of information these regulations are to be considered only as a guide. *The intelligence officer of every unit must adapt procedure to the needs of his unit and arm of the service. Simplification of method will be especially necessary in the smaller units of the more mobile arms.* Under no circumstances should a G-2 allow himself to be engulfed in a mass of paper work when the situation is moving so rapidly as to prevent the maintenance of all records suggested, to the exclusion of the real mission of assembling and interpreting information and disseminating military intelligence.

b. After the initial examination, each item of information should be recorded in such a manner as to be convenient for reference and study. Accordingly, each item is recorded in one or more ways—in the G-2 journal, the G-2 work sheet, or upon the G-2 situation map; sometimes a single item will be recorded in all three. By these means a systematic running account

is kept of all information received at headquarters and the intelligence officer is enabled conveniently to analyze and evaluate the information and later to classify and prepare it for use and for dissemination as military intelligence. The journal, the work sheet, and the situation map are necessary in the preparation of G-2 reports and serve as a convenient means of reference for the commander and for members of his staff.

19. **G-2 journal.**—*a.* The G-2 journal is the daybook of the intelligence office. It is kept by the G-2 office of each combat unit down to include the division. In brigades and lower units the G-2 journal may be combined with those of the other staff sections. It contains briefs of important written and oral messages received and sent, as well as notations of periodic reports, orders, and similar matters that pertain directly to the military intelligence section. If the item is received or issued in oral form, the entry in the journal is detailed; but if it is in documentary form, the entry may consist of a reference and a brief synopsis of the contents.

b. The journal is kept as a permanent record and should be looked upon as the main and primary record of the operations of the intelligence section of the staff. For this reason, entries in the journal are made immediately upon receipt of the report of the event. The original entry should not be altered, but may be supplemented by subsequent entries.

c. The journal is either closed daily or at the end of a phase or period. One copy of it is turned over to the chief of staff for consolidation with the other journals of the headquarters. The journal is supported by a file of original orders, reports, special reports, studies, and maps pertinent to the operations of the military intelligence section.

d. The form of the journal is prescribed in part one, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

20. **G-2 work sheet.**—*a.* The purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate the systematic arrangement of information coming into the intelligence office, so that all items bearing on a particular subject will be grouped together for ready reference and comparison. In this respect the work sheet differs from the G-2 journal, in which the information is entered chronologically. A secondary purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate the preparation of the G-2 report. For this reason the G-2 work sheet has the same paragraphing as the G-2 report, suitable space being left under each heading for the entry of pertinent information.

b. The work sheet is merely a convenient memorandum pad for the intelligence officer and is not a permanent document. It should always be up to date, obsolete items being either lined out or withdrawn.

21. **G-2 situation map.**—*a.* The G-2 situation map is kept by the intelligence officer of each combat unit. Upon it is recorded graphically all available information of the enemy in a convenient form for ready reference and study. The situation map supplements but cannot take the place of the work sheet.

b. The map used for this purpose should be the best available. Its proper scale will depend on the size of the unit; the smaller the unit the larger should be the scale of the map. However, all headquarters should have on hand copies of all the maps used by units down to the smallest, so that there will be no danger of having reports and messages refer to places not shown on the maps available at the headquarters.

c. The terrain covered should include that in possession of our own troops as well as that held by the enemy. Information of the enemy that is of importance to the particular unit is placed on the situation map by means of conventional signs or symbols, care being taken to prevent it from becoming too cluttered up. This information will vary with the size of the unit, the smaller the unit the more detailed being the information recorded.

d. It is often necessary or advisable to show on the situation map certain of our own dispositions in order that the hostile situation may be more readily understood. The information necessary to keep up this side of the map is obtained from G-3 and all information in regard to enemy dispositions should be promptly furnished to G-3 for inclusion on the G-3 operations map.

e. The situation map is kept constantly up to date, new sheets being used when necessary. A tracing or a copy of this map, showing the situation as known at the close of the period, should accompany the intelligence report.

f. In brigades and lower units it is not customary for each staff section to keep a separate situation map, but the data from each section are ordinarily entered on one map which is kept under the supervision of the executive officer.

22. **Observer's report.**—*a.* The observer's report is an intelligence document on which is reported enemy information for a given period or mission.

b. The form of an observer's report will vary in the different arms and will be prescribed in their respective Field Manuals.

23. G-2 files.—*a.* Copies of the messages sent and received are carefully preserved, as they support entries in the journal, the work sheet, the situation map, and the G-2 report.

b. A suitably indexed file is kept of all information that may be of future value. For example, during a period of stabilization much information will be collected which is of no immediate interest but which may become invaluable in case an attack is ordered. This will cover such subjects as the hostile defenses, conditions of roads, railways, and bridges within the hostile lines, location and contents of supply establishments, location of hostile reserves, and many other items. If published in periodic reports as it comes in, it will be disregarded and forgotten by most of the recipients and will not be available when needed. A preferable way is to place it in a file where it will be available for immediate check against new information. When an operation is planned in which the information will be needed, G-2 should issue a situation map and a study or special report embodying all the available information. Such data may include shelled areas, gassed areas, sensitive points, movements, supply establishments, artillery locations, and progress of enemy works.

c. Personal collections of documents are strictly forbidden. Every item of information regardless of its source or content is official and must be promptly recorded and filed in the prescribed manner.

SECTION V

EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATION

24. Purpose.—*a.* The purpose of the critical and systematic analysis of enemy information is to determine its probable accuracy, significance, and importance. Information subjected to this process becomes military intelligence.

b. The intelligence officer should not merely transmit information but should analyze, evaluate, and interpret enemy information and transmit the resulting military intelligence to all concerned. Military intelligence must be concise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready for immediate use; at the same time it must be so complete as to convey not only the facts but also their significance, as well as all the deductions to

be drawn from a consideration of them in connection with other intelligence already at hand.

25. Evaluation.—Evaluation is the determination of the probable value of information. The following items are considered:

a. Credibility of source.—The credibility of the source or agency reporting information must be determined. The following are some of the important points to receive attention:

(1) Judging from previous experience, is the source of information accurate and reliable?

(2) Under the conditions existing at the time, that is, distance, means employed, visibility, etc., could the information have been obtained?

b. Accuracy of information.—The accuracy of the information must be determined. This is facilitated by a consideration of the following points:

(1) Is it confirmed or corroborated by other information previously received?

(2) In what respects does it agree or disagree with available information covering the same point, particularly that known to be correct?

(3) If it is at variance with information previously received, which is more likely to be correct?

26. Interpretation.—*a.* The accuracy and credibility of information having been determined by comparing it with information previously received, the intelligence officer's next step is to interpret the information in the light of its probable significance. The following are some of the important questions that should be considered:

(1) What does it mean in connection with what is already known?

(2) Does it alter or add significance to information previously received?

(3) Does it tend to confirm the estimate as to the enemy situation or does it indicate that the estimate is incorrect?

b. Up to this point in the intelligence officer's reasoning, his deductions have been concerned only with the facts of the enemy situation. The whole process has been an effort to establish accurately the facts. Based on the situation, conclusions as to the enemy capabilities should be reached later.

27. Answer to essential elements of information.—*a.* Essential elements of information relating to the terrain may be

answered as soon as sufficient credible information is available upon which to base a conclusion.

b. Essential elements of enemy information may be answered only after careful check of evaluated information against all possible lines of action open to the enemy. The intelligence officer endeavors to verify or disprove each hypothesis relative to possible lines of action open to the enemy. To do this he obtains all the facts possible concerning the enemy situation; facts bearing on each hypothesis. Then, in the light of these ascertained facts, he considers whether the enemy is still capable of acting in accordance with a certain hypothesis. By eliminating as many of these hypotheses as possible he narrows down the lines of action which were originally open to the enemy to those which are still open to him. The ideal answer is to narrow down the possible lines of action to the one which he will adopt. More often the best that can be done will be to indicate a probable priority among the various lines of action that the enemy may adopt. However, it may be impossible to do even this. The intelligence officer must constantly be on guard against an unwarranted conclusion that the enemy will follow a certain line of action. Unjustified, preconceived ideas as to enemy intentions have frequently led to faulty decisions by commanders. Even in the exceptional case when G-2 has indicated the probable line of action to be adopted by the enemy, he should continue to investigate other capabilities until they are clearly no longer possible of adoption.

28. Conclusions.—a. The study of all available information should enable the intelligence officer to—

(1) Determine the enemy capabilities or the lines of action open to the enemy that would have a bearing on the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

(2) Determine the conditions under which any particular capability may be carried out; for example, the time, place, and strength of an attack.

(3) Draw conclusions in certain cases as to the relative probability of adoption of the lines of action open to the enemy.

b. The conclusions of the intelligence officer should permit the commander to plan his operation, taking into account the lines of action open to the enemy, particularly the one given as first priority, if a priority has been designated. Additional information acquired during the progress of operations should enable the intelligence officer progressively to narrow down the lines of action open to the enemy in time to prevent a surprise.

SECTION VI

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

29. Necessity.—Military intelligence is of no use unless it reaches the individuals or units concerned in time to serve their purposes. It is therefore of the utmost importance that it be properly and quickly disseminated in accordance with its urgency.

30. Methods.—a. *Personal contact.*—It is frequently possible for G-2 or his assistants to transmit, either in person or by telephone, items of information of immediate value to those concerned.

b. *Special messages.*—When it is impossible for G-2 to transmit important information either in person or by telephone, special messages may be transmitted by airplane, motorcycle messenger, or other rapid means of communication.

c. *Conferences.*—The exchange of information between the various military intelligence sections of higher, lower, and adjacent units is facilitated by frequent personal conferences between the staff officers concerned. In no other way can a community of thought and adjustment of viewpoints be so quickly and effectively realized.

d. *G-2 estimate of the enemy situation.*—(1) A G-2 estimate of the enemy situation will be furnished the commander by the intelligence officer, either upon his own initiative when warranted by the developments in the situation or when required by the commander. The estimate may be written or oral. It will summarize the enemy situation and possible plans. Usually G-2 will be able to anticipate the necessity for such an estimate; however, he must be prepared at all times to furnish an estimate to his commander.

(2) A form for a G-2 estimate of the enemy situation is as follows:

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Title
Place
Date and hour

1. Summary of the enemy situation.¹
 - a. Enemy activities in forward areas and identifications.
 - b. Movements, concentrations, and establishments in rear areas.
 - c. The terrain as it affects the enemy.
2. Conclusions.
 - a. *Enemy capabilities*.—An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of the mission of the command.
 - b. (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
 - (2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.²

(Signature of chief of section)

¹ Omit subheadings when these are not applicable.

² This justification usually must consist of definite information of enemy dispositions which favor one or more capabilities and militate against others. Under exceptional circumstances, even though the enemy dispositions may not favor any particular capability, a thorough knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine, recent performances, national psychology, and the character and mentality of the hostile commander may justify an indication of priority. The basis for indicating a priority must be clearly stated. When the enemy dispositions do not favor any capability, the mere fact that G-2 thinks he would adopt a certain line of action if he were in the place of the enemy, or that the terrain favors a certain capability, is insufficient justification.

e. *Periodic G-2 report*.—(1) The periodic G-2 report is an intelligence document that sums up information which has been collected, evaluated, and interpreted during a given period. It is issued by all military intelligence sections of combat units from the army to the division, inclusive, and is usually supplemented by a situation map or overlay. Brigades and lower units ordinarily submit one staff or unit report which includes appropriate paragraphs relative to intelligence. The period of time to be covered by this report is prescribed by higher headquarters or by the unit commander in the absence of such instructions. It is a convenient means for keeping higher, lower, and adjacent units informed of the enemy situation as determined by the unit preparing the report. It frequently contains important information which has already been disseminated by means of special messages.

(2) Each commander is most interested in hostile units of the same size as his own. The subordinate units should be able to obtain from the periodic G-2 report and the situation map the facts concerning the enemy situation so far as they have been determined at the time of the report. In the smaller units, such as the battalion and regiment, the report will go into considerable detail and consider the very smallest hostile unit. Going up the scale of command, the reports become a little less detailed and treat the information from a broader viewpoint.

(3) The periodic G-2 report will usually be of considerable interest to higher authority, although the information contained therein frequently will be known prior to its arrival. Periodic reports will contain details which may be essential to certain studies, and also information which, even though not demanding immediate exploitation, is nevertheless of considerable importance to higher authority; for example, data on hostile tactical methods.

(4) G-2 reports and situation maps are intended primarily for use during contact with the enemy. They also serve a purpose for units not engaged, for they permit all commanders to keep in touch with the general situation of the enemy and with the local situation at points where the unit is likely to be engaged.

(5) The form for the G-2 report is prescribed in part one, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

f. *Special reports*.—Although higher echelons will receive copies of the periodic G-2 reports of the next lower unit, these periodic reports, as has been indicated, are more or less com-

plete documents with rather wide distribution. Their preparation, reproduction, and transmission will require much more time than would a brief message capable of being transmitted by telephone. Consequently, higher echelons, in addition to receiving periodic reports, will usually require special reports from lower units, summarizing the situation and enemy capabilities. These reports lack the mass of detail normally contained in a periodic report, but present the general picture to higher authority and in particular contain such information as would be of interest to the latter. They should be prepared in written form by G-2 and approved by the commander or chief of staff. They will usually take the form suggested above for the G-2 estimate of the situation.

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